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Archive for February, 2008


Turkmenistan: Gas Rationing Stirs Rare Public Outrage

The honeymoon appears to be over for Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. After raising gasoline prices in a painful move toward liberalizing the economy, the 50-year-old leader faces an angry public at home, one year into his first term.

The Turkmen people are known for being patient. Decades of dictatorship and isolation has a way of doing that. So reports that some Turkmen reacted to higher prices at the pump by torching gasoline stations came as something of a surprise, to say the least.

As bizarre as Turkmenistan was under the late President Sapamurat Niyazov, it was not without its perks. Gas, water, electricity, and salt were all offered free of charge. In 1992, Niyazov argued that as the country had vast natural resources and would make huge profits from natural-gas exports, the Turkmen people should enjoy the fruits of independence from the Soviet Union.

But under Niyazov, people enjoyed very little. Which is why many of them are now seething over the February 8 decree by Berdymukhammedov that raised the price of gasoline — and provided as clear a glimpse as any into the challenges facing the president should he decide to further liberalize the state-dominated economy.

More Than Just Gas

“In Mary Province, two gasoline stations were set on fire,” a local woman tells RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service, adding that anger and despair prompted people to set gas stations on fire. “Before the price hike, there were huge crowds of people at gas stations. They were waiting in long queues day and night to buy gasoline” before the price hike.

Gasoline had long been affordable for Turkmen, whose country is rich in hydrocarbons. Until last week, a liter of gasoline cost about as much as a loaf of cheap bread.

Now, under the new system, drivers can claim coupons for 120 liters of free gas per month. Drivers of trucks and buses get 200 liters and motorcycle owners 40 liters. But there’s a catch. Gas purchased above the monthly limit will be sold at around $0.60 per liter, compared to the previous rate of $0.08 per liter.

That’s a huge increase anywhere, but particularly painful in a country whose average monthly salary is $50. The increased price has also led to higher public transport fares and brought price hikes among foodstuffs.

Bus fares have reportedly increased from 5,000 to 10,000 manats, or from $1 to $2, according to the official exchange rate.

“Since the gas price hike, prices for other goods have also been on the rise,” says the woman from Mary Province. “Everything is more expensive now in bazaars: Eggs cost 1,700 manats, and a kilogram of chicken thighs is 37,000 manats.”

She says that “there is panic among people” and “crowds and queues at gasoline stations.”

‘Nothing But Suffering’

While the move has been a shock to the Turkmen people, it’s also arguably the first unpopular decision by Berdymukhammedov. His previous moves had been popular, including restoring pensions abolished by Niyazov and allowing the opera, ballet, and circus to return to the Turkmen stage.

The government’s decision to compensate for the gas price hike by allocating a free quota of gasoline appears not to have cushioned the blow.

Gurbandurdy Durdikuliev, a civil activist from Balkan Province, says the government’s latest move has brought “nothing but suffering.”

He complains that car owners receive gasoline rations for one vehicle, no matter how many automobiles they have, and says there are “long lines” at the state’s Daikhan Bank, which is reportedly the only entity that is authorized to issue the ration coupons. He also notes that drivers must get their technical inspections and registrations in order or they are not entitled to the gasoline rations.

“It is nothing but a headache for people,” he says. “They complain. They are not happy. I believe people’s lives have gotten worse.”

Durdikuliev predicts that the new procedures will lead to increased corruption among road police and bank officials.

Exiled Turkmen opposition leades have also criticized Berdymukhammedov’s gasoline policy. Chary Charyev, an opposition activist, wrote on the Turkmen opposition website “Turkmenskaya Iskra” on February 11 that the free gas allowance is “free cheese in [Berdymukhammedov's] mousetrap” and claimed that “no one was happy” about it.

But economic liberalization, as other post-Soviet states know all too well, might also be a painful first step toward adopting a market economy. Advocates of such steps argue that, in the long run, they can usher in greater freedom and prosperity. Whether Berdymukhammedov intends to push further in this direction is unclear, but some economists argue that he had little choice but to increase gasoline prices that have long lagged behind world rates.

“The previous Turkmen leadership [under Niyazov] set most prices without taking into account economic conditions — they simply made popular decisions,” says Murad Esenov, editor in chief of the Sweden-based “Central Asia and the Caucasus” journal, noting that the prices of essentials like flour, fuel, and electricity were far below market rates. “Those who worked in the energy sector or agriculture had virtually no profit from the sale of their products. So purely from an economic point of view, the current revision of prices is a very good economic decision.”

Esenov says unpopular moves like raising prices always have negative consequences, adding that the Turkmen government should increase social security measures to protect people from poverty.

“There’s no other way in economics,” he says.
 

Inflation Surges to 11-Year High in China

Inflation rose to its highest level in over 11 years in January as the worst snowstorms in half a century compounded already-tightening supply conditions. 

Global Insight Perspective  
Significance The consumer price index (CPI) rose 7.1% on the year in January while factory gate prices rose 6.5%, fuelled by rising input costs.
Implications Consumer price inflation remains supply-driven, with non-food prices dampened by the extensive nature of current capital-intensive growth.
Outlook Inflation is expected to accelerate in the first half of 2008 before current supply constraints ease. The central bank is expected to remain a tightening bias in monetary policy aimed not primarily at inflation, but at containing risks generated by the investment cycle.

Prices Keep on Rising

Inflation accelerated in January to an 11-year high, confirming fears that prices would surge during the month. Data released by the National Bureau of Statistics today showed that the consumer price index rose 7.1% on the year, following a 6.5% annual gain in the previous month. It stood as the fastest rate of inflation since September 1996 when the consumer price index (CPI) rose 7.4% in annual terms. The upswing in final-stage goods prices had been expected after data released yesterday showed that the producer price index (PPI) increased 6.1% in January; the strongest growth in three months. In December 2007, the PPI rose at a more moderate rate of 5.4%.  

Food prices remained the primary driver of inflation as existing supply problems were exacerbated by the worst snowstorms in half a century. Distribution networks were blocked and crop production interrupted. Overall food prices rose 18.6% on the year, accelerating from the 16.7% annual gain recorded in December. Food prices have experienced rapid inflation in recent months as blight and unseasonable weather have undermined supply. Meat and poultry prices surged 42.0% on the year in December, largely reflecting the persisting pork supply gap. Agricultural production is also energy intensive, forcing producers to pass on rising production costs to consumers. Longer-term structural factors also come into play. Rapid urbanisation is fuelling demand for food, while the area of cultivatable land is declining. Fresh vegetable prices increased 13.7% on the year while grain prices rose 5.7%. Farmers are also shifting production to cash crops to capitalise on soaring global prices. Concurrently, the cost of imported foodstuffs to plug gaps in the supply chain has soared in the wake of rapid appreciation in global food prices.

Schizophrenic Inflation

However, non-food inflation remained weak despite the upswing in producer prices fuelled by higher input costs. In January, the sub-index for consumer durable and service prices rose 2.1%, holding within the 1.7%-2.2% trading band of the past year. Consumer durable prices alone rose by just 0.7% year-on-year (y/y) while the cost of telecoms products tumbled 19.6%. The dormant state of non-food price inflation reflects structural factors in the economy. Firstly, the state controls oil production, with increases in administered prices lagging far behind movements in global oil markets. Effectively, state oil companies are subsidising oil usage through their own profit margins. More fundamentally, the Chinese economy’s disinflationary rapid growth suggests that the current economic cycle is being driven by a supply boom, underpinned by surging rates of investment. Money supply growth remained robust in January, maintaining momentum generated in 2007, with the M2 measure posting annual growth of 18.9%. It marked the fastest growth in the money supply since May 2006.

Outlook and Implications

The acceleration in inflation in January indicates that government price controls imposed earlier in the month have so far had a limited effect. The caps - which came into effect on 17 January - apply to a wide range of goods: from grain, edible oil, milk, meat, and liquid petroleum gas (LPG), to school fees and fertilisers. Producers of specified products or services are now required to submit any planned increases in prices of more than 4.0% to the government for approval 10 days prior to any adjustment. In addition, the Chinese cabinet amended the Regulation on Administrative Punishment for Price Violations to allow harsher penalties for price manipulation, collusion, and other pricing-related malpractice; meanwhile, local governments have been instructed to conduct special checks on grain, oil, meat, and LPG prices to ensure price stability and enforce the new regulations. Application of the controls was timed to coincide with the onset of China’s Lunar New Year - a period during which food demand typically escalates.

Moreover, given the supply-led nature of current inflationary pressures, monetary tightening will have a marginal impact on prices. The central People’s Bank of China is expected to implement more aggressive monetary tightening, but this is directed more at reining in liquidity growth. Central bank intervention to mitigate the impact of surging foreign capital inflows on the renminbi exchange rate continues to fuel money supply growth. Risks are being generated as the state sector continues to dominate financial intermediation. Should a downturn occur, companies may face problems in servicing liabilities as their margins remain low. The intensity of tightening measures implemented thus far is unlikely to generate a serious dent in liquidity growth. The aggressive reserve-requirement ratio increases, and rises in deposit rates, have simply been ineffective in reining in bank lending. The fact is, years of administrative controls on lending following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis have left the banks with much excess reserve; the reserve ratio increases of recent quarters simply did not matter to the banks. Indeed, both loan growth and broad money-supply (M2) growth have picked up in 2007, despite the repeated increase in the reserve ratio. However, further rate hikes risk fuelling capital inflows as the differential over comparable U.S. instruments grows amid the Federal Reserve’s implementation of swingeing cuts to boost domestic demand there. Subsequently, monetary tightening is expected to be concentrated in the second half of the year, allowing growth to run at full throttle ahead of China’s showcasing at the Olympic Games in August of this year.

As monetary policy is hamstrung by conflicting risks and supply constraints persist, Global Insight expects inflation to remain high through 2008. Supply constraints in the pork sector are not expected to ease until the second half of 2008 given the maturation cycle of livestock, while global oil and other commodity input prices will also remain elevated. Contracted steel prices for Chinese companies are expected to rise by around 65% in 2008, exerting further pressure on company bottom lines. Global Insight forecasts that consumer price inflation will average 5.8% in 2008. Inflation remains a highly politicised issue in China, accentuated by intensifying income inequality. Unofficial figures point to a sharp escalation in labour unrest as workers from groups unaffiliated with the national All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Wildcat strikes, often involving over 1,000 workers and staged in protest at low pay and poor working conditions, are reported to be running at more than one a day. General discontent with authorities has been fuelled by high-profile incidents, including the death of three people at a Carrefour supermarket last year in Chongqing as a sale of cooking oil sparked a stampede.

A fundamental rethink of the monetary policy approach is required, while redress needs to be made of the economy’s increasingly pressing structural problems, reflected baldly in the schizophrenic inflationary trends. Future management of the exchange rate factors heavily into the equation as the risks generated by its inflexibility are weighed against the potential risks of full capital-account liberalisation. However, with policy management still inflected with such political concerns, the risks of a hard landing for the economy will rise in line with the subsequent intensity of those adjustments and the co-ordinated management of the economy’s wider and growing imbalances.
 

Rand Movements to be the Wild Card in South African Economy

Since the end of December 2007, the rand has depreciated heavily against the currencies of its major trading partners, but this could provide a short-term boost to the country’s competitiveness.

Global Insight Perspective  
Significance A depreciating rand could boost the country’s competitiveness over the short term, but may impact negatively on inflation and interest rates.
Implications Over the short term, economic growth will benefit, but rising inflation will impede this growth over the longer term. 
Outlook Global Insight expects the rand to depreciate by around 7.3% in 2008, thus slowing the downward trend in interest rates expected from the second half of the year onwards.

From the end of December 2007 to 15 February 2008, the rand weakened by 12% and 11.5% against the U.S. dollar and the euro respectively, compared to 3% and 2.6% over the same period last year. The rand also fell by nearly 16% against the yen and 10% against the pound sterling in the same period. Previously, the real effective exchange rate of the rand has been notoriously volatile, but showed a measure of stability over the past two years, while weakening steadily at a rate of 2.5% and 3.5% in 2006 and 2007 respectively. This weakening was mainly driven by exposure to a growing current-account deficit in South Africa. However, in 2008 the slowing global, especially U.S., economy - helped along by financial uncertainty and increasing risk aversion among foreign investors, and coupled with electricity supply problems in South Africa - added to the depreciating bias of the currency.

The Effect of 15% Depreciation against U.S. Dollar

Under the assumption that the current depreciating trend of the rand will continue, an alternative simulation has been done using the Global Insight South African macro-econometric model, in which the rand is expected to depreciate by 15% against the U.S. dollar from the first to the last quarter of 2008. A depreciating rand stimulates exports and inhibits the demand for imports (with a lag). Despite some short-term effects - export prices adjust slower to exchange-rate depreciation than import prices - the current account of the balance of payments improves over the longer term (around 1.2 percentage points by 2009). Real output growth rises on average by 0.4% in 2008 and 1.0 % in 2009 when compared to the baseline.

However, the depreciation increases the cost of imported goods, which with lags translates into higher producer and consumer price inflation. CPIX inflation (excluding mortgages) shows an increase of 1.4% in 2008 and 0.9% in 2009 compared to the baseline. As prices rise, inflation expectations rise, pushing up nominal wages and unit labour costs, which in turn further fuels domestic inflationary processes. This also reduces foreign competitiveness. With inflation and, more importantly, inflation expectations rising, the monetary authorities will usually react with higher real interest rates. These then lower domestic demand and economy-wide levels of capacity utilisation fall. The extent and timing of the increase in real interest rates will ultimately affect the extent of the downward adjustment of domestic demand and output. However, the simulation shows that GDP growth could again be lower by up to two percentage points in 2010 compared to the baseline.

Outlook and Implications

The extent and duration of rand depreciation depends heavily on the international financial situation. However, we forecast that the global scenario will stabilise as supportive actions by the U.S. monetary authorities take affect and lead to a dollar weakness. Improving global market conditions will bolster investor confidence and support emerging market currencies once again and South Africa’s current account is expected to be sufficiently funded by foreign inflows. With limited electricity outages later in the year, following the successful implementation of energy action plans in South Africa and supported by buoyant commodity prices, the rand is now expected to average the year around 7.57 rand:US$1 (from the previously expected 7.1 rand:US$1), giving a depreciation of around 7.3% from 2007. The effect on prices will thus be less than indicated in the alternative scenario. Domestic inflation will also be tempered by lower domestic food prices as good summer rains indicate a bumper crop this year. Nevertheless, a weaker currency could slow the downward trend in interest rates expected from the middle of 2008 onwards.
 
 

After Almost Fifty Years in Power, Cuba’s President Castro Bows Out

Cuban President Fidel Castro has confirmed that he will not be accepting another term as president of the Caribbean island, leaving the path clear for his brother and current interim president Raul to take the reins.

Global Insight Perspective  
Significance The announcement, which was made days before the new national assembly appoints a new government, does not come as a surprise; President Fidel Castro yielded power - albeit “temporarily” - more than 16 months ago after undergoing intestinal surgery.
Implications Castro’s effective resignation has triggered much international diplomatic activity, with representatives of European countries lobbying more vociferously than ever for democratic reforms.
Outlook In the short term it is unlikely that any change will take place in the Caribbean country; it remains to be seen if in the mid-term the regime will adopt gradual reforms or if it will extend the status quo.

Castro Calls it a Day

In an article in the official media Cuban President Fidel Castro has announced that he will not accept another term as president of the Caribbean island. The announcement was made just days before the national assembly meets (next Sunday, 24 February) to appoint a new government. Castro was re-elected as member of parliament for the province of Santiago de Cuba in the national election, which took place on 20 January (see Cuba: 21 January 2008: Election 2008: Cubans Re-Elect Ailing Leader as Member of Parliament and Cuba: 18 January 2008: Election 2008: Cuba to Hold First Parliamentary Poll Since Interim President Took the Helm).

The announcement should come as no surprise, as Castro himself had already stated in early January that he did not intend to accept another term as government head given his delicate health. Although Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who met with the eighty-one-year-old revolutionary leader in mid-January, said that Castro was ready to return to power, the ailing president was quick to say that his health prevented him from fulfilling the role and indicated that he would stand down in the short term (see Cuba: 16 January 2008: Brazil Pledges Energy Investment in Cuba; Two Leaders Meet). In August 2006 Castro underwent intestinal surgery that forced him to put in place constitutional arrangements to hand power to his brother and vice-president Raul Castro. Since that time the younger Castro has been at the helm of the island’s government.

International Community Calls for Reforms

Within hours of the announcement, Spanish and French officials called for changes in Cuba. Western governments are keen to nudge Raul Castro in the direction of pro-democratic reforms. Trinidad Jiménez, Spain’s sub-secretary for Latin America, said that the interim president should adopt a batch of reforms in Cuba now that his older brother will officially no longer be part of the government. Similar comments were made by Jean-Pierre Jouyet, French secretary for European affairs, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP).

Although there is no official reaction from the United States at the time of writing, the current administration has been clear in the past that it will maintain the economic embargo on Cuba until the Caribbean island has embraced democratic values. Most likely the administration of President George W. Bush will insist on this matter and will call for drastic reform in Cuba, and this will be echoed by the conservative community of exiled Cubans that reside in the U.S. state of Florida. However, one must also look at the countries’ relations in the context of the upcoming presidential election. George W. Bush is constitutionally required to step down, and leadership change could open the way for greater engagement with the Cuban regime. However, the three main hopefuls left in the race have been cautious with their statements to date. One would expect a Democratic president to be more open to policy change than a Republican given the influence Cuban exiles have within the latter party, but the Democrats have supported the embargo in the past. Democratic frontrunner Illinois Senator Barack Obama has indicated that he would be prepared to talk to “rogue” world leaders such as Castro, and has also backed more open travel and remittances policies towards the island. However, this does not mean the embargo would disappear in the short term. Much would, of course, depend upon how prepared the new Cuban leader was to reach out. Obama’s rival, New York Senator Hillary Clinton, has been more forthright in backing the embargo until democracy takes root, but she could soften her stance in light of Cuba’s leadership transition. The presumed Republican candidate, Arizona Senator John McCain, has been outspoken of late in criticising the regime’s torture record, something that earned a sharp rebuke from Fidel Castro last week. His stated policies appear close to Clinton’s - the embargo stays until democracy is restored.

No comment has yet been made by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, who has been a key partner of the Castro regime. The South American country provides the Communist regime with key support in terms of preferential oil prices, investment in oil infrastructure in the central region of Cienfuegos, and aid to ease Cuba’s housing deficit. Most likely Chávez will defend the status quo in Cuba and will continue to pour in financial support through the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).

Outlook and Implications

The fact that Castro has announced that he will not be the official head of state in Cuba in the future does not mean that he will vanish from the political scene. Indeed, he will continue to write in the official media and express, through this means, his opinion on both domestic and international issues. In addition, it is unlikely that Raul Castro would adopt changes in the Caribbean island in the short term. In fact, history has shown that Cuba does not respond well to external demands, and pressure from the international community to change could delay a transition to democracy. Indeed, the Cuban government will be keen to preserve the ideals and social achievements of the Revolution.

In the mid-term Raul Castro, almost certainly Cuba’s next president, could well adopt reforms to attract much-needed foreign investment, but he is playing his cards close to his chest. To attract large-scale investment the younger Castro, who is seen as more pragmatic than his brother, would need to make room for democratic values, conversion into a single currency, and clearer property ownership rights. The other key factor to watch is how the next U.S. president chooses to play the situation. Barack Obama is the most likely of the three hopefuls to introduce a substantial shift. His rivals stress that democracy must come first, dismissing the alternative argument that a more open stance from the United States would spur reform momentum and political change on the island.
 

 

After Almost Fifty Years in Power, Cuba’s President Castro Bows Out

Cuban President Fidel Castro has confirmed that he will not be accepting another term as president of the Caribbean island, leaving the path clear for his brother and current interim president Raul to take the reins.

Global Insight Perspective  
Significance The announcement, which was made days before the new national assembly appoints a new government, does not come as a surprise; President Fidel Castro yielded power - albeit “temporarily” - more than 16 months ago after undergoing intestinal surgery.
Implications Castro’s effective resignation has triggered much international diplomatic activity, with representatives of European countries lobbying more vociferously than ever for democratic reforms.
Outlook In the short term it is unlikely that any change will take place in the Caribbean country; it remains to be seen if in the mid-term the regime will adopt gradual reforms or if it will extend the status quo.

Castro Calls it a Day

In an article in the official media Cuban President Fidel Castro has announced that he will not accept another term as president of the Caribbean island. The announcement was made just days before the national assembly meets (next Sunday, 24 February) to appoint a new government. Castro was re-elected as member of parliament for the province of Santiago de Cuba in the national election, which took place on 20 January (see Cuba: 21 January 2008: Election 2008: Cubans Re-Elect Ailing Leader as Member of Parliament and Cuba: 18 January 2008: Election 2008: Cuba to Hold First Parliamentary Poll Since Interim President Took the Helm).

The announcement should come as no surprise, as Castro himself had already stated in early January that he did not intend to accept another term as government head given his delicate health. Although Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who met with the eighty-one-year-old revolutionary leader in mid-January, said that Castro was ready to return to power, the ailing president was quick to say that his health prevented him from fulfilling the role and indicated that he would stand down in the short term (see Cuba: 16 January 2008: Brazil Pledges Energy Investment in Cuba; Two Leaders Meet). In August 2006 Castro underwent intestinal surgery that forced him to put in place constitutional arrangements to hand power to his brother and vice-president Raul Castro. Since that time the younger Castro has been at the helm of the island’s government.

International Community Calls for Reforms

Within hours of the announcement, Spanish and French officials called for changes in Cuba. Western governments are keen to nudge Raul Castro in the direction of pro-democratic reforms. Trinidad Jiménez, Spain’s sub-secretary for Latin America, said that the interim president should adopt a batch of reforms in Cuba now that his older brother will officially no longer be part of the government. Similar comments were made by Jean-Pierre Jouyet, French secretary for European affairs, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP).

Although there is no official reaction from the United States at the time of writing, the current administration has been clear in the past that it will maintain the economic embargo on Cuba until the Caribbean island has embraced democratic values. Most likely the administration of President George W. Bush will insist on this matter and will call for drastic reform in Cuba, and this will be echoed by the conservative community of exiled Cubans that reside in the U.S. state of Florida. However, one must also look at the countries’ relations in the context of the upcoming presidential election. George W. Bush is constitutionally required to step down, and leadership change could open the way for greater engagement with the Cuban regime. However, the three main hopefuls left in the race have been cautious with their statements to date. One would expect a Democratic president to be more open to policy change than a Republican given the influence Cuban exiles have within the latter party, but the Democrats have supported the embargo in the past. Democratic frontrunner Illinois Senator Barack Obama has indicated that he would be prepared to talk to “rogue” world leaders such as Castro, and has also backed more open travel and remittances policies towards the island. However, this does not mean the embargo would disappear in the short term. Much would, of course, depend upon how prepared the new Cuban leader was to reach out. Obama’s rival, New York Senator Hillary Clinton, has been more forthright in backing the embargo until democracy takes root, but she could soften her stance in light of Cuba’s leadership transition. The presumed Republican candidate, Arizona Senator John McCain, has been outspoken of late in criticising the regime’s torture record, something that earned a sharp rebuke from Fidel Castro last week. His stated policies appear close to Clinton’s - the embargo stays until democracy is restored.

No comment has yet been made by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, who has been a key partner of the Castro regime. The South American country provides the Communist regime with key support in terms of preferential oil prices, investment in oil infrastructure in the central region of Cienfuegos, and aid to ease Cuba’s housing deficit. Most likely Chávez will defend the status quo in Cuba and will continue to pour in financial support through the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).

Outlook and Implications

The fact that Castro has announced that he will not be the official head of state in Cuba in the future does not mean that he will vanish from the political scene. Indeed, he will continue to write in the official media and express, through this means, his opinion on both domestic and international issues. In addition, it is unlikely that Raul Castro would adopt changes in the Caribbean island in the short term. In fact, history has shown that Cuba does not respond well to external demands, and pressure from the international community to change could delay a transition to democracy. Indeed, the Cuban government will be keen to preserve the ideals and social achievements of the Revolution.

In the mid-term Raul Castro, almost certainly Cuba’s next president, could well adopt reforms to attract much-needed foreign investment, but he is playing his cards close to his chest. To attract large-scale investment the younger Castro, who is seen as more pragmatic than his brother, would need to make room for democratic values, conversion into a single currency, and clearer property ownership rights. The other key factor to watch is how the next U.S. president chooses to play the situation. Barack Obama is the most likely of the three hopefuls to introduce a substantial shift. His rivals stress that democracy must come first, dismissing the alternative argument that a more open stance from the United States would spur reform momentum and political change on the island.
 
 

Global Pipeline Plans Expand

Planned pipeline construction to be completed in 2008 rose by more than one-third from the previous year, driven by large crude oil transportation projects in both the US and Asia-Pacific. Plans for 2008 construction of both natural gas and products pipelines also expanded from those for 2007.

Operators plan to install nearly 13,500 miles in 2008 alone (Table 1), with natural gas construction making up 56% (more than 7,500 miles) of the plans, based on reports from the world’s pipeline operating companies and data collected by Oil & Gas Journal.

Looking forward to 2008 and beyond, greater mileage is planned for both natural gas and products pipelines than had been the case a year ago, with a slight downturn in crude lines stemming from the large quantity of mileage expected to be completed this year.

 
US demand for natural gas continued to drive large infrastructure projects such as pipelines in 2008, with a growth of planned construction for the year in the US helping balance a temporary downturn in Asia-Pacific activity. Long-term natural gas pipeline plans (2008 and beyond) in Asia-Pacific more than doubled year-on-year, however, driving much of the future increase seen in planned miles.

Large expansions in crude systems in both the US and Asia-Pacific keyed a nearly four-fold 2008 increase in miles expected to be completed in that sector from global totals the previous year.

Plans for construction of product pipelines in 2008 were nearly flat globally, with a large increase in US construction expected to be completed this year making up for steep declines in both the Asia-Pacific and Europe.

 

As 2008 began, operators had announced plans to build more than 85,500 miles of crude oil, product, and natural gas pipelines beginning this year and extending into the next decade (Fig. 1), a substantial increase over data reported last year (OGJ, Feb. 19, 2007, p. 48) in this report. Most (nearly 72%) of these plans are for natural gas pipelines, an increase from the previous year.

Outlook
The continued up-tick in worldwide pipeline construction trends follows US Energy Information Administration energy consumption forecasts, which show continued growth, even if at a slower rate than predictions from a year ago.

EIA forecast world marketed energy consumption to increase by 57% through 2030 (using a 2004 baseline), a period that encompasses the long-term pipeline construction projections stated here.

Energy demand growth will be strongest, according to the midyear 2007 analysis, among non-OECD countries. This non-OECD growth will be led by non-OECD Asia, which includes China and India, where demand will grow more than 3.2%/year.

Fueling this energy demand growth is an acceleration of projected gross domestic product growth in non-OECD Asia to 5.8%/year through 2030 - led by China at 6.5%/year, the highest projected growth rate in the world - compared with 4.1% worldwide. EIA ascribed the stronger global growth projection (up from 3.0/year projected in 2006) to more optimistic assumptions of growth in China and India.

Structural issues that have implications for medium to long-term growth in China include the pace of reform affecting inefficient state-owned companies and a banking system that is carrying a large number of nonperforming loans, according to the EIA. The development of domestic capital markets to help macroeconomic stability and ensure China’s large savings are used efficiently supports the medium-term growth projections, according to the EIA.

In December 2007, the EIA reduced projected US energy consumption in 2030 to 123.8 quadrillion btu, 7.4 quadrillion btu lower than the previous year’s projection. Even with this nearly 6% drop, however, energy consumption is still likely to increase more rapidly than energy production. Projections for imports’ share of consumption in 2030 slipped to 29% from 30%, with rising fuel prices expected to both spur domestic production and moderate demand growth.

EIA projects domestic natural gas production in 2030 of 19.9 tcf/year, compared with the 21.15 tcf/year projected for 2030 in the prior year’s report. After a 2019 peak at 4.5 tcf/year, EIA sees Lower 48 offshore production declining to 3.5 tcf/year in 2030, as investment is inadequate to maintain production levels. This is both a later peak and larger 2030 production level than the EIA projected the previous year.

EIA, however, made a large downward revision in its projections of natural gas consumption in 2030, now pegged at 23.4 tcf/year vs. the 26.9 tcf/year projected a year earlier. Expected consumption is lower in all sectors, particularly industrial and electric power, which will be slowed by higher natural gas prices and slower growth in electricity demand.

Net pipeline imports of natural gas from Canada and Mexico will fall from 2.9 tcf in 2006 to 0.5 tcf in 2030, according to the EIA, which last year pegged 2030 net pipeline imports at 0.9 tcf. EIA ascribed the difference to both increased exports to Mexico as the growth rate of Mexican production sinks and decreased imports from Canada due to resource depletion in Alberta and Canada’s growing domestic demand.

EIA also sharply reduced the amount of LNG it expects the US to be importing annually in 2030, from 4.5 tcf in its 2007 annual outlook to 2.9 tcf in this year’s publication, ascribing the lower projection to higher costs, especially of liquefaction capacity, and decreased US consumption due to higher natural gas prices, slower economic growth, and expected global competition for available LNG supplies.

Even these smaller projected volumes, however, will have to be brought to the end-user market via pipeline, as will future unconventional domestic production and any new supplies from Alaska.

OGJ has for more than 50 years tracked applications for gas pipeline construction to what is now called the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Applications filed in the 12 months ending June 30, 2007 (the most recent 1-year period surveyed), suggest continued strength in US interstate pipeline construction.

Some 2,032 miles of pipeline were proposed for land construction, but only 18 miles were proposed for offshore work. For the earlier 12-month period ending June 30, 2006, more than 1,450 miles were proposed for land construction.
FERC applications for new or additional horsepower at the end of June 2007 also continued their recent surge, reaching more than 713,000 hp, all onshore, compared with 583,000 hp of new or additional compression applied for a year earlier and 175,000 hp the year before that.

In line with the upswing in FERC applications, prospects for oil, natural gas, and products pipeline construction appear healthy (Tables 1 and 2), led by a surge in expected work in the US and Asia-Pacific.

 

US energy demand in 2008, however, will be nearly unchanged from last year. Weakness in the US economy, in addition to a global economic slowdown, could hold growth in check. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told the US House Budget Committee last month that downside risks to US economic growth in 2008 are now more pronounced.

As tight fundamentals, difficult geopolitics, and fears that an economic recession will reduce demand continue to worry energy markets, it is important to bear in mind that large infrastructure projects such as pipelines can slip in their schedules or be canceled outright as the perceived ability to construct and operate them at a profit erodes.

Bases, costs
For 2008 only (Table 1), operators plan to build nearly 13,500 miles of oil and gas pipelines worldwide at a cost of about $37 billion. For 2007 only, companies had planned more than 10,000 miles at a cost of more than $18 billion.

For projects completed after 2008 (Table 2), companies plan to lay more than 72,000 miles of line and spend nearly $201 billion. When these companies looked beyond 2007 last year, they anticipated spending more than $107 billion to lay nearly 57,000 miles of line.

Projections for 2008 pipeline mileage reflect only projects likely to be completed by yearend 2008, including construction in progress at the start of the year or set to begin during it.
Projections for mileage in 2008 and beyond include construction that might begin in 2008 and be completed in 2009 or later.

Also included are some long-term projects judged as probable (such as at least two pipelines competing to bring Arctic gas to the continental US), even if they will not break ground until after 2008.

US average costs-per-mile for onshore and offshore pipeline construction (Table 4, OGJ, Sept. 3, 2007, p. 51) on FERC applications submitted by June 30, 2007, were $2.8 million and $3.2 million, respectively.

Based on historical analysis and a few exceptions and variations notwithstanding, these projections assume that 90% of all construction will be onshore and 10% offshore and that pipelines 32 in. OD or larger are onshore projects.

Following is a breakdown of projected costs, under these assumptions and OGJ pipeline-cost data:

Total onshore construction (12,808 miles) for 2008 only will cost more than $35.5 billion:
$1.6 billion for 4-10 in.
$9.3 billion for 12-20 in.
$5.6 billion for 22-30 in.
$19 billion for 32 in. and larger.
Total offshore construction (662 miles) for 2008 only will cost nearly $2.1 billion:
$204 million for 4-10 in.
$1.2 billion for 12-20 in.
$715 million for 22-30 in.
Total onshore construction (70,217 miles) for beyond 2008 will cost nearly $195 billion:
$2.2 billion for 4-10 in.
$19.5 billion for 12-20 in.
$25.7 billion for 22-30 in.
$147 billion for 32 in. and larger.
Total offshore construction (1,899 miles) for beyond 2008 will cost more than $6 billion:
$279 million for 4-10 in.
$2.5 billion for 12-20 in.
$3.3 billion for 22-30 in.

Action
What follows is a rundown of major projects in each of the world’s regions.

North America
Pipeline construction projects mirror end users’ energy demands, and much of that demand, both in the US and globally, continues to center on natural gas, with the industry remaining focused on how to get that gas to market as quickly and efficiently as possible. The following sections look at both natural gas and liquids pipelines, starting with North America.

Gas, NGL
The Calypso pipeline, proposed by Calypso US Pipeline LLC, a subsidiary of SUEZ Energy North America Inc., once premised on the construction of an LNG terminal at Freeport Harbor on Grand Bahama Island, will now run to shore from an anchor-and-buoy deepwater port 8-10 miles off Port Everglades, Fla.

The 1-bcfd Calypso Deepwater Port project received its draft environmental impact statement in November 2007. The facility mirrors the design of a SUEZ port planned for offshore Massachusetts and will move gas to shore through a truncated version of the already FERC-approved pipeline. Calypso expects to start construction this year.

The 842-MMcfd Ocean Express pipeline, proposed by AES Corp., is premised on construction of an LNG terminal at Ocean Cay, an industrial site in the Bahamas. It would entail installation of 54.3 miles of 26-in. mostly subsea pipeline from the EEZ boundary to Broward County, Fla.

AES is currently pursuing final permits for the project and will have a construction schedule in place once these are secured.

Elsewhere in North America, the race continued to bring Arctic gas south to major US consuming centers.

Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin notified ConocoPhillips in January that she rejected the company’s proposal to build an Alaska gas pipeline to transport North Slope gas to the Lower 48 states. Meanwhile, a 60-day public comment period began Jan. 5 regarding TransCanada’s gas pipeline proposal under the Alaskan Gasline Inducement Act. ConocoPhillips’s application was outside the AGIA solicitation.

TransCanada’s application was the only one of five formal AGIA applications to meet all the state’s requirements. Other applications were submitted by Sinopec of China, AEnergia of California, and two Alaska groups: the Alaska Gasline Port Authority and the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority.

Following the allotted period for comment, Palin can submit the proposal to the state legislature.

TransCanada proposed a 48-in. pipeline extending from Prudhoe Bay to Alberta, where it would tie into existing pipelines that transport gas to US markets. The project’s estimated cost is $26-35 billion, and - if authorized by lawmakers - the proposed pipeline could start operation in 2017.

The proposed pipeline would follow the route of the existing trans-Alaska oil pipeline and the Alaska Highway, and continue through northern British Columbia to link with the pipeline grid in northwestern Alberta.

In Canada, the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline would stretch more than 750 miles to transport Mackenzie River Delta gas to Alberta and beyond. Plans call for initial capacity of 1.2 bcfd, expandable to 1.9 bcfd. The project is currently in regulatory reviews. Participants expect permits to be awarded by spring or late summer 2008 and gas to begin flowing in 2014, although major unanticipated expenses could create setbacks.

Questions remain, for instance, concerning who will pay for the proposed gathering system in the Mackenzie Delta. The Northwest Territories government has suggested that Canada’s federal government build it because it could be a facilities investment extending beyond oil and gas.

In addition to the Aboriginal Pipeline Group, other pipeline partners are Imperial Oil Ltd. 34.4%, ConocoPhillips Canada 15.7%, Shell Canada 11.4%, and ExxonMobil Canada 5.2%

The partners updated cost estimates in March 2007 to $16.2 billion (Can.) from the $7 billion (Can.) filed by Imperial just 3 years ago. Costs include $7.8 billion for the Mackenzie Valley mainline, $3.5 billion for the gas gathering system, and $4.9 billion for anchor-field development.

 

Large domestic west-to-east natural gas expansions also continued to be planned in the US. The Rockies Express pipeline, running 1,323 miles of 42 in. pipe from Cheyenne, Wyo., and Colorado to Clarington, Ohio, is the largest new US pipeline project undertaken in 20 years (Fig. 2). The 1.8 bcfd, $3 billion line has firm commitments in place for 900 MMcfd, including a binding 500 MMcfd by EnCana Corp. and a conditional 400 MMcfd from the Wyoming Natural Gas Pipeline Authority.

Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP will operate the pipeline and owns two thirds of the project. Sempra Pipelines & Storage holds one third of it. In exchange for capacity commitments, some shippers may exercise options for equity in the project, which could give KMP a minimum of 50% and Sempra 25% after construction.

The pipeline, which KMP expects to be completed by June 2009, will be brought on line in three segments.

REX-Entrega, running from Greasewood, Kanda, and Wamsutter to the Cheyenne Hub in Colorado is already in service. REX-West, covering the next 710 miles from the Cheyenne Hub in Colorado to Audrain County, Mo., and interconnecting with five other interstate pipelines, is scheduled to be in service this month.

The 639-mile REX-East segment from Missouri to Ohio received its draft environmental impact statement in November 2007. In addition to the 42-in pipeline, FERC’s REX-East draft EIS covered the possible environmental impacts of 20 metering stations and 7 new compressor stations, including 2 to be built along the REX-West in Wyoming and Nebraska.

FERC noted that the REX-East project would follow existing rights-of-way for more than 59% of its route and would be consistent with or conform to federal resource management plans.

Construction is scheduled to begin in summer 2008, with targeted partial service of the pipeline, meter stations, and most compressor stations by the following December. Full service is expected by June 2009.

Kinder Morgan and Energy Transfer Partners LP will jointly develop the Midcontinent Express Pipeline. The 1.4-bcfd pipeline will be about 500 miles long, originating near Bennington, Okla. It will run through Perryville, La., and terminate at an interconnect with Transco in Butler, Ala.

Pending regulatory approvals, the $1.25 billion project will be in service by February 2009. MEP has prearranged binding commitments for 800 MMcfd, including a commitment from Chesapeake Energy Marketing Inc. for 500 MMcfd.

MEP filed with FERC requesting a certificate of public convenience and necessity in October 2007 that would authorize construction and operation of the system. Construction on the pipeline is to begin this August.

Spectra Energy Transmission plans another capacity expansion of its 9,040-mile Texas Eastern pipeline system connecting Texas and the Gulf Coast to the US Northeast. The project, designated Time 3, involves expanding the pipeline system from Oakford, Pa., through addition of compression and pipeline looping. Existing rights of way will be used where possible. At an estimated $300 million, the Time 3 project is to enter service in late 2010.

ONEOK Partners LP and a subsidiary of Williams Cos. Inc. have formed a joint venture to construct and operate the 760-mile Overland Pass NGL pipeline from Wyoming to Kansas. The 110,000-b/d pipeline, consisting of 14 and 16-in. pipe will enter service by the middle of this year, with a 150 mile, 14-in. lateral from the Piceance basin entering service in 2009. When combined with its 440 mile, 160,000-b/d Arbuckle pipeline, from southern Oklahoma through the Barnett Shale to Mont Belvieu, Tex., and also set for 2009 completion, ONEOK will have more than 1,300 miles of NGL line in service by then.

Crude
Canadian oil sands will surpass deepwater wells as the single largest global source of new oil exports by the end of this decade, according to Jeff Rubin, chief market strategist and economist at CIBC World Markets, the wholesale and corporate banking arm of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Rubin also stated that Canada’s oil sands represent 50-70% of the world’s oil reserves open to private investment, depending on the investment climate in Nigeria and Kazakhstan (OGJ Online, Oct. 8, 2007).

This supply’s proximity to US demand has helped make export lines for Canadian crude a large portion of the work to be completed in the US for 2008. TransCanada Corp. is preparing to begin construction this spring on the 1,379-mile US portion of its Keystone oil pipeline project, which will transport oil from Canada to the US Midwest.

Keystone will total 3,456 km, including additions to existing Canadian pipelines and mainline flow reversals. It is to start up in late 2009 with capacity to deliver 435,000 b/d of crude oil from Hardisty, Alta., to the US at Wood River and Patoka, Ill.

The company has entered into contracts or conditionally awarded about $3 billion for major materials and pipeline construction.

TransCanada applied to Canada’s National Energy Board in November for additional pumping facilities to expand Keystone’s capacity to 590,000 b/d and extend the line to Cushing, Okla., starting in 2010. Based on the increased size and scope of the project and the executed material and service construction contracts, the Keystone project cost is now estimated at $5.2 billion.

The plans to expand Keystone follow successful completion of an open season that secured an additional 155,000 b/d of firm contracts for oil delivery from Hardisty to Cushing (OGJ, July 16, 2007, p. 10).

The project has secured firm long-term contracts totaling 495,000 b/d for an average of 18 years.

Keystone received NEB approval this year for two major applications to construct and operate the Canadian portion of the project. Keystone received its final EIS from FERC in January.

The Keystone project is one of two currently progressing systems planned to deliver crude oil from Hardisty to the US Midwest. Enbridge Energy Partners LP, also of Calgary, plans its own pipeline expansion to deliver 400,000 b/d of crude oil to the US.

The Southern Access system expansion will use 42-in. pipe to allow for future expansions of as much as 800,000 b/d on its Canadian mainline from Hardisty to the international border near Neche, ND, and new pipeline construction in the US. The new pipeline will be added between Superior, Wis., and Flanagan, Ill., just west of Chicago, on Enbridge’s Lakehead system.

The US portion of the expansion will cost about $1 billion and will take place in the three stages. The first stage added 44,000 b/d of capacity in 2007 and is to begin operations this year. An additional 146,000 b/d will be constructed this year and enter service in spring 2009, with the final 210,000 b/d also to be built in 2008 and enter service in 2009, bringing the system up to its 400,000 b/d capacity.

The final stage will run 286 miles of 36-in. pipe from Flanagan south to Patoka and can be expanded to 800,000 b/d by adding pumps.

At Flanagan, the new line will also have access to Chicago and will interconnect with Enbridge Inc.’s Spearhead pipeline, which began deliveries to Cushing Mar. 1, 2006.

Accompanying the Southern Access expansion is Enbridge’s Southern Lights 180,000-b/d Chicago-to-Edmonton diluent pipeline. Shippers have committed to 162,000 b/d, with the balance retained for spot suppliers. Enbridge will build 674 miles of 16 or 20-in. pipe from the Chicago area to Clearbrook, Minn. About 442 miles of this construction uses the same right of way as the Southern Access expansion. Enbridge will reverse the flow of its existing Line 13 to carry the diluent from Clearbrook to Edmonton, replacing this volume with a new 20-in 185,000 b/d pipeline from Cromer, Man., to Clearbrook and an expansion of its existing Line 2.

Beyond these two projects, Enbridge intends to build the Alberta Clipper crude pipeline between Hardisty and Superior, Wis. This 1,000-mile segment is designed to resolve expected capacity constraints and to be in service by mid-2010, after the Southern Access program is completed and as crude oil supplies from Western Canada continue to increase. Initial capacity will be 450,000 b/d, with ultimate capacity of up to 800,000 b/d available.

Enbridge expects supply from Western Canada oil sands developments to grow by as much as 1.8 million b/d by 2015.

Enbridge and ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. also announced in December that they will conduct commitment solicitation for a proposed new pipeline system to transport crude from Patoka to the Texas Gulf Coast. The new Texas Access Pipeline would transport crude oil sourced from the Canadian oil sands region in Alberta and from the upper US Midwest to refiners in Nederland and Houston.

The proposed project consists of construction of a 768 mile, 30-in. pipeline to Nederland and an 88 mile, 24-in. pipeline from Nederland to a delivery point in east Houston.

The commitment solicitation is to secure shipper interest in executing binding commitments to transport specified volumes of crude oil on the new pipeline, expected to be completed in 2011. Its results will guide and determine further development.

Minnesota Pipe Line Co. is expanding its pipeline system to transport additional Canadian crude to Minneapolis-St. Paul-area refiners. The company’s MinnCan Project will add a new 300 mile, 24-in. pipeline to its existing system. Minnesota Pipe Line expects 100,000 b/d to move on the pipeline once completed in late 2008, though it will actually have 165,000 b/d of initial capacity and the potential to expand to 350,000 b/d. Work began on the pipeline in August 2007.

Enterprise Products Partners LP will construct, own, and operate an oil export pipeline to provide firm gathering services from the BHP Billiton-operated Shenzi field located in South Green Canyon, Gulf of Mexico. The Shenzi pipeline will start in 4,300 ft of water at Green Canyon Block 653, about 120 miles off the coast of Louisiana. The 83 mile, 20-in. pipeline will have the capacity to transport 230,000 b/d and will connect the field to the Cameron Highway Oil Pipeline and Poseidon Oil Pipeline systems at Enterprise’s Ship Shoal 332B junction platform.

BHP Billiton expects Shenzi production to begin in mid-2009. Saipem America began installation of precrossing concrete mattresses for the pipeline in September 2007.

Products
Colonial Pipeline Co. received assurances from FERC encouraging it to invest $1 billion in an expansion of its mainline petroleum products pipeline. To ease constraints on its system, Colonial plans to construct and operate 500 miles of 36-in. pipeline between Louisiana and Georgia to transport at least 800,000 b/d, a 30% increase in capacity.

In July 2007, Colonial filed an application with the Georgia Department of Transportation requesting permission to build between the Alabama state line and suburban Atlanta, using the same right-of-way of its two existing mainlines.

Colonial estimates the expansion will enter service in 2010.

Kinder Morgan is continuing the development of its $400 million CALNEV pipeline expansion following July 2007 FERC approval of its rate structure. Expansion of the 550-mile pipeline involves construction of a 16-in. pipeline from Colton, Calif., to Las Vegas, Nev., and will increase the system’s capacity to 200,000 b/d, transporting products for the military at Nellis Air Force Base. The company said a further capacity increase to more than 300,000 b/d is possible with the addition of pump stations.

The new pipeline will parallel existing utility corridors between Colton and Las Vegas. Following its completion, the existing 14-in. line will be transferred to commercial jet fuel service for McCarran International Airport and any future airports planned in Las Vegas, with the 8-in. pipeline that currently serves the airport purged and held for future service.

Start-up of the new line is scheduled for late 2009 or early 2010.

Holly Corp. and Sinclair Transportation Co. plan to build a products pipeline extending from Salt Lake City to Las Vegas. The UNEV Pipeline project includes construction of associated terminal facilities in Cedar City, Utah, and northern Las Vegas.

The 430 mile, 12-in. line will cost about $300 million and have an initial capacity of 62,000 b/d, expandable to 120,000 b/d. It will serve refineries and shippers along its route and interconnect to the Pioneer Pipeline.

The system is slated for completion by the end of this year.

Latin America
Intergovernmental meetings held in 2006 regarding construction of a 7,776-mile pipeline to transport natural gas from Venezuela to Argentina through Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay have yielded little concrete progress on the project since. The line, if constructed, would cost $25 billion and could take 5 years to construct. It has a projected capacity of 150 million cu m/day.

Talks culminated in the January 2007 signing of a declaration between Brazil and Venezuela authorizing construction of the pipeline’s first leg, to begin in 2009.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ascribes the subsequent slowing of progress to dissent between potential participating nations and attempts at subversion by the US government.

Petrobras signed an accord with the Goias state government to build the country’s first ethanol pipeline, a $226 million, 975-km line to transport 1.056 billion gal/year. The pipeline will run from Goias to a refinery in Paulinia, near Sao Paulo. Japan’s Mitsui and Brazil’s Camargo Correa are also participating in the project, with plans for a feasibility study announced in March 2007. Petrobras plans to have the line in service by 2010.

Three other Brazilian ethanol pipeline proposals have also emerged; a second from Petrobras and two non-Petrobras projects

Ethanol producers in Parana state proposed a $315 million, 528-km pipeline to Paranaqua, to be completed in 2011. The other non-Petrobras line would run 300 km across Sao Paulo state from Paulinia to the port of Sao Sebastiao, carrying 1.32 billion gal/year.

Tidelands Oil & Gas Corp. subsidiary Sonora Pipeline LLC received permitting in March 2007 from FERC for construction of the US portion of the Burgos Hub Export-Import project. Tidelands subsidiary Terranova Energia had previously received approval from the Mexican government for both the Occidente and Oriente sections of the project.

The Occidente section will use 323 km of 30-in. pipe, running from the Brasil storage field to Nuevo Progresso, Mexico, with a proposed international pipeline crossing into South Texas from Mexico at the Donna Station. This crossing will allow interconnections with TETCO, TGPL, and Texas Gas Services. The pipeline will also include a stretch from Brasil to Arguelles, where another proposed crossing into South Texas would facilitate interconnection with Houston Pipeline, Calpine, and Kinder Morgan.

The Oriente section will use 36-in. line spanning 149 km. It will run from a proposed offshore LNG regasification terminal to Norte Puerto Mezquital and from there to the Brasil storage field.

Proposed US construction totals 29 miles of 30-in. pipeline.

The system is designed to flow natural gas bidirectionally between Texas and Mexico at a rate of 1.2 bcfd, but is being built to address an expected sharp increase in Mexican demand for imported gas starting in 2010.

Asia-Pacific
Industrial growth in Western Australia prompted an increase in the size of the proposed Stage 5 expansion of the Dampier-Bunbury natural gas trunkline to handle an additional 140 terajoule/day of natural gas expected to come online in 2008-10.

Stage 5A will duplicate about half the current mainline length, comprising 10 loops that will connect to previously constructed Stage 4 loops. The new loops will total 570 km, adding around 100 TJ/day of capacity. Stage 5A is expected to cost $660 million (Aus.). Work began in late February 2007, with commissioning expected next month.

Stage 5A(2) will add another 40 TJ/day and has been approved by Dampier Bunbury Pipeline. It will involve an additional 140 km of looping, some compressor station modifications, and is expected to be commissioned by 2010.

The Indonesian government tendered in January 2006 for the construction of a 1,219-km natural gas pipeline between Bontang in East Kalimantan and Semarang in Central Java. The pipeline, estimated to cost $1.7 billion, would carry 700-1,000 MMcfd of natural gas.

PT Bakrie & Bros. won the tender to build and operate the pipeline and in December 2006 said it plans to proceed with the project despite doubt voiced by officials about its feasibility. In May 2007 the Indonesian government said it would revoke PT Bakrie & Bros. building rights unless construction started by July of that year, but reversed course in June, stating that Bakrie’s progress reports had been sufficiently detailed to justify their continued participation.

PT Perusahaan Gas Negara was in the early stages of building the South Sumatra to West Java Transmission Pipeline Project Stage 1 in November 2007. Stage 1 will use 375 km of 32-in. pipe to move gas from Pagardewa (South Sumatra) to Cilegon (Banten). Stage 2 will transport natural gas from Pagardewa to Labuhan Maringgai (South Sumatra) and from Muara Bekasi (West Java) to Rawa Maju (West Java) using a combined 100 km of 28 and 32-in pipe.

Indonesia has also offered construction of both the Gresik to Semarang and Semarang to Cirebon pipelines to private contractors.

In December 2007 Russia and Turkmenistan agreed to accelerate development of the proposed Caspian Gas Pipeline. The decision followed agreement the prior month on amendments to the gas supply contract governing the export of Turkmen gas to Russia. On completion in 2012, the pipeline will extend 510 km along the coast of the Caspian Sea—360 km through Turkmenistan and another 150 km through Kazakhstan - before connecting with the existing Central Asia-Center gas pipeline network at the Russian-Kazakh border.

Turkmen gas will also be moving east to China. Kazakhstan and China agreed in August 2005 to build a 40 to 48-in. natural gas pipeline running from western Kazakhstan to China. Now extended into Turkmenistan, the 4,350-mile pipeline is scheduled to deliver 30 billion cu m/year by 2012. Construction began on the Turkmen section in August 2007. About 117 miles will be laid in Turkmenistan, 329 miles through Uzbekistan, 803 miles through Kazakhstan, and 2,796 miles in China as that country’s second West-East Gas Pipeline, terminating in Guangzhou.

China plans more that 20,000 km of domestic pipeline construction, more than 15,000 km of which will be built by the end of 2010, a large portion consisting of this system.

The first West-East Gas Pipeline, running 4,000 km from the Xinjiang Uygar Autonomous region to Shanghai and other eastern provinces, entered service in 2004. It is being expanded to 17 billion cu m/year from 12 billion cu m/year. Construction on the second line is scheduled to start next year. It will parallel the first line until Gansu before separating to reach Guangzhou.

The project will comprise more than 8,500 km of line when eight branch lines are included, at an estimated cost of nearly $20 billion. Construction is expected to begin this year.

The Caspian nations are not the only countries actively pursuing export projects to China, with much of the crude mileage planned in the Asia Pacific region for 2008 consisting of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean crude line running to China from Russia.

The first stage of the 4,700-km project includes construction of a 2,400-km oil pipeline from Taishet to Skovorodino near the Chinese border and of a rail oil terminal at the Perevoznaya Bay at a combined cost of $7.9 billion. The second stage, depending on development of Eastern Siberian oil fields, involves construction of a pipeline link between Skovorodino and Perevoznaya on Russia’s Pacific Coast.

China looks to import as much as 30 million tonnes/year of crude if a pipeline spur is built from Skovorodino to Daquing. In November 2007 the premiers of both countries agreed that the spur would be built and the entire line placed in service by the end of this year, but progress has slowed since, Transneft cautioning that completion of the first stage could be delayed by several months.

Supplies along the Skovorodino-Perevoznaya route would total 50 million tonnes/year, the bulk of which would be exported to Japan, but hinge entirely on a combination of continued development of the Siberian fields, other fields, and Russia’s continued desire to export to Japan.

Urals Energy in October 2007 received approval from Transneft to build a pipeline tie-in from its Dulisminskoye field to ESPO. First oil from the field is expected to flow into ESPO during the first half of 2009.

In December 2006, OAO Gazprom agreed to acquire, for $7.45 billion, a 50%-plus-one share stake from Sakhalin-2 project operator Sakhalin Energy Investment Co. Ltd. - Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Mitsui & Co., and Mitsubishi Corp. Construction of one onshore pipeline section halted in July 2007 due to safety and environmental concerns, even as the rest of construction activity continued pace.

The total pipeline project comprises two 800-km systems (one gas, one oil) running from production at the northeastern edge of Sakhalin Island to terminals at the southern tip.

Beyond the export projects to Russia and China described earlier in this section, Turkmenistan has also agreed to supply natural gas to Pakistan over 30 years via the proposed $2 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline. India has also expressed its willingness to participate in the 1,680-km pipeline.

A 735 km Afghani segment lies between a 145 km Turkmen length and the final 800 km through Pakistan.

Turkmenistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement to revive the line in July 2007, with Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov saying that Turkmenistan would send 30 billion cu m/year through the line. Outside analysts, however, have voiced skepticism regarding Turkmenistan’s ability to meet these supply commitments at the same time it has agreed to ship large volumes of gas to both Russia and China.

Europe
Work started in early December 2005 on the Russian onshore section of the Nord Stream pipeline in Babayevo. This 56-in. segment will stretch 917 km to the Baltic Sea coast near Vyborg, linking existing gas pipelines from Siberia to the NEGP project. Seven compressor stations will provide the necessary pressure. The pipeline will cross the Baltic, making landfall near Greifswald, Germany. This section will be 1,200 km in length with a 48-in. OD. Environmental studies regarding offshore pipelay activities and pressure testing began last month.

The full system is scheduled to start operations in 2011 at a capacity of 27.5 billion cu m/year. The project includes building a second, parallel pipeline, doubling capacity to about 55 billion cu m/year. This second pipeline is planned to come on stream in 2012.

A joint venture consisting of Gazprom (51%), Wintershall AG (20%), E.ON Ruhrgas AG (20%), and NV Nederlandse Gasunie (9%) is building the pipeline. The total cost for the offshore project will amount to more than €5 billion, with Gazprom investing an additional €1.3 billion in the onshore section.

Gaz de France, and Finland have also voiced interest in participating in the project.

Russia began production at the 825.2 billion cu m Yuzhno Russkoye oil and gas condensate field in December 2007. Gas from this field will be shipped through Nord Stream once it is completed.

Gazprom and Eni SPA agreed in December 2007 to build the 560-mile South Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea and through Bulgaria. Bulgaria and Russia reached agreement last month. On completion, the $10 billion line could distribute gas to northern and southern Europe, with an estimated capacity of 30 billion cu m/year. A feasibility study is set to be completed by the end of this year. Participants plan to deliver first gas through South Stream by 2013.

Medgaz began onshore trenching for the 8 billion cu m/year Algerian-European gas pipeline bearing the same name in July 2007, having received all regulatory approvals within the scheduled timeframes. The first shipment of offshore pipe (35,000 tons of 12-m lengths with a 24-in OD) arrived in Spain in October 2007. The project is expected to cost €900 million, with start-up slated for 2009. This figure includes past costs of the project, construction, start-up, and preinstallation of future extension points in the coastal section.

Medgaz’s offshore length is 210 km, and it will reach a maximum water depth of 2,160 m. Supplies will come from the Hassi R’Mel-Beni Saf gas pipeline operated in Algeria by Sonatrach. Upon landfall in Spain, the pipeline will link with the Almería-Albacete gas pipeline operated by Enagas, facilitating its connection to the Spanish and European gas grid. Gaz de France, which owns a 12% stake in the project, contracted for 1 billion cu m/year of gas through Medgaz starting in 2009 with a 20-year term.

Other interests in Medgez are: Sonatrach (36%), Cepsa and Ibedrolla (20% each), and Endesa (12%).

Plans to export Algerian gas via Italy have also progressed, Galsi SPA and Snam Rete Gas SPA having signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2007 to construct the Italian section of the planned 8 billion cu m/year Galsi natural gas pipeline, which will deliver Algerian gas to Italy via Sardinia.

Gasli shareholders are Sonatrach, Edison SPA, Enel SPA, Hera Trading, Regione Sardegna, and Wintershall AG.

The project envisions four pipeline segments: 640 km onshore between Hassi R’mel gas field in Algeria and El Kala on the Algerian coast; 310 km between El Kala and Cagliari on Sardinia in water as deep as 2,850 m; 300 km between Cagliari and Olbia on the northern Sardinian coast; and 220 km between Olbia and Pescaia, southeast of Florence, in water as deep as 900 m.

Sardinia is set to receive gas supplies starting in 2012 from the new line.

Sonatrach will deliver 3 billion cu m/year into the system, Enel, 2 billion cu m/year, and Hera Trading, 1 billion cu m/year.

Austria’s OMV AG continues to advance the 56-in. Nabucco pipeline, which will bring some combination of Central Asian, Caspian, and Middle Eastern gas to the Baumgarten hub in Austria near the Slovakian border at a rate of 31 billion cu m/year, before moving it on to Western Europe. The $6.5 billion pipeline, spanning 3,300 km, is to be completed by 2013.

Feasibility studies have led to a two-stage construction plan. The first phase, starting construction next year, calls for 2,000 km of pipe between Ankara, Turkey, and Baumgarten, allowing 8 billion cu m/year of gas from the existing Turkish pipeline network to be transported by 2012. Second-stage construction would begin in 2012 and build eastward from Ankara to the Iranian and Georgian borders (Fig. 3).

 

The European Union has given its backing to the proposal, appointing a coordinator who seeks to make the line the core of European Union energy policy and asking the five-company consortium (OMV, MOL Rt., Botas, Bulgargaz, and Transgaz SA) developing the project to allow RWE AG and Gaz de France to participate. The lack of firm gas-supply commitments, however, continues to weigh on project financing.

Middle East
Iran, Pakistan, and India continued discussions toward building the long-contemplated gas export line from Iran to India during 2007. Gazprom has also expressed interest in participating in the $7 billion project, which would transport as much as 120 million cu m/day of natural gas from the South Pars field in the Persian Gulf through 2,100 km of 56-in. OD line (Iran, 1,100 km; Pakistan, 750 km; India, 250 km).

Natural gas pricing agreements have been reached between Iran and Pakistan, but India’s status remains uncertain. In addition to difficulties reaching economic terms, India is under US pressure to not participate in the project and has security concerns regarding having such a major energy artery running through Pakistan.

Pakistan has said that it will build its portion of the pipeline between 2009 and 2011, while Iran stated in July 2007 the construction of its section was 18% complete.

 
Iran is also building a 2,163-km ethylene pipeline from Assaluyeh in southern Iran to the country’s northwestern provinces (Fig. 4). The pipeline will transport ethylene to meet the feed requirements of new petrochemical complexes in Gachsaran, Kermanshah, and Mahabad.

Construction of the pipeline began in 2003 and is targeted for completion in 2009-10. The West Ethylene Pipeline was initially to transport 1.5 million tonnes across 1,500 km to feed five planned petrochemical complexes. The Iranian Parliament, however, instructed the Petroleum Ministry to build five more complexes in the cities of Andimeshk, Dehdasht, Hamedan, Kermanshah, and Miyandoab as a means to boost production in the less-developed parts of the country. The pipeline’s length, therefore, was extended to 2,163 km and capacity increased to 2.8 million tonnes.

Olefin plants in Assaluyeh and the Bandar Imam special economic petrochemical zone in Mahshahr City will supply the ethylene.

Bakhtar Petrochemical Co., which is constructing the pipeline, is a private joint stock holding company.

Calvalley Petroleum Inc. will build and operate 250 km of 16-in. crude oil pipeline in Yemen between Blocks 9 and 18, crossing a number of development areas before reaching a tie-in to an export pipeline already in place running from Block 18 to the Ras Isa terminal on the Red Sea.

Last month the company awarded and received Yemeni approval of an engineering, procurement, and construction management contract for the pipeline.

Africa
Nigeria, Algeria, and Niger hope to start gas exports via the proposed 18-25 billion cu m/year Trans-Sahara gas pipeline in 2015. Once built, the 4,300-km line would transport gas from the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria through Niger and into Algeria and Europe. Cost estimates for the project are $10-13 billion.

A senior energy delegation from Algeria, Nigeria, and Niger visited Brussels in August 2007 to promote TSGP to potential investors and European gas consumers seeking to diversify gas supply sources.

According to the feasibility report published by engineering company Penspen Consulting, TSGP would comprise a 48-56-in. pipeline from Nigeria to Algeria’s Mediterranean coast at Beni Saf and subsea pipelines of 20-in. between Beni Saf and Spain.

Europe expects to import 500 billion cu m of gas in 2020. Europe’s Energy Commissioner Andris Pielbags cautiously welcomed the pipeline, stressing the need for Europe to diversify gas suppliers and enhance security of supply. Pielbags, however, said it was important to determine the availability of proved gas reserves, the feasibility of the project, its economic viability, and geopolitical developments in the region.

Tony Chukwuku, Director of Nigeria’s Petroleum Resources, admitted that Nigeria’s export plans were ambitious, particularly as it is trying to boost the use of domestic gas for electric power generation.

India has also voiced interest in participating in the project.

Sonatrach has secured cathodic protection for the 665 km NK-1 Haoud el Hamra-to-Skikda oil pipeline. Construction of the line is to be completed this year.
 

Rand Movements to be the Wild Card in South African Economy

Since the end of December 2007, the rand has depreciated heavily against the currencies of its major trading partners, but this could provide a short-term boost to the country’s competitiveness.

Global Insight Perspective  
Significance A depreciating rand could boost the country’s competitiveness over the short term, but may impact negatively on inflation and interest rates.
Implications Over the short term, economic growth will benefit, but rising inflation will impede this growth over the longer term. 
Outlook Global Insight expects the rand to depreciate by around 7.3% in 2008, thus slowing the downward trend in interest rates expected from the second half of the year onwards.

From the end of December 2007 to 15 February 2008, the rand weakened by 12% and 11.5% against the U.S. dollar and the euro respectively, compared to 3% and 2.6% over the same period last year. The rand also fell by nearly 16% against the yen and 10% against the pound sterling in the same period. Previously, the real effective exchange rate of the rand has been notoriously volatile, but showed a measure of stability over the past two years, while weakening steadily at a rate of 2.5% and 3.5% in 2006 and 2007 respectively. This weakening was mainly driven by exposure to a growing current-account deficit in South Africa. However, in 2008 the slowing global, especially U.S., economy - helped along by financial uncertainty and increasing risk aversion among foreign investors, and coupled with electricity supply problems in South Africa - added to the depreciating bias of the currency.

The Effect of 15% Depreciation against U.S. Dollar

Under the assumption that the current depreciating trend of the rand will continue, an alternative simulation has been done using the Global Insight South African macro-econometric model, in which the rand is expected to depreciate by 15% against the U.S. dollar from the first to the last quarter of 2008. A depreciating rand stimulates exports and inhibits the demand for imports (with a lag). Despite some short-term effects - export prices adjust slower to exchange-rate depreciation than import prices - the current account of the balance of payments improves over the longer term (around 1.2 percentage points by 2009). Real output growth rises on average by 0.4% in 2008 and 1.0 % in 2009 when compared to the baseline.

However, the depreciation increases the cost of imported goods, which with lags translates into higher producer and consumer price inflation. CPIX inflation (excluding mortgages) shows an increase of 1.4% in 2008 and 0.9% in 2009 compared to the baseline. As prices rise, inflation expectations rise, pushing up nominal wages and unit labour costs, which in turn further fuels domestic inflationary processes. This also reduces foreign competitiveness. With inflation and, more importantly, inflation expectations rising, the monetary authorities will usually react with higher real interest rates. These then lower domestic demand and economy-wide levels of capacity utilisation fall. The extent and timing of the increase in real interest rates will ultimately affect the extent of the downward adjustment of domestic demand and output. However, the simulation shows that GDP growth could again be lower by up to two percentage points in 2010 compared to the baseline.

Outlook and Implications

The extent and duration of rand depreciation depends heavily on the international financial situation. However, we forecast that the global scenario will stabilise as supportive actions by the U.S. monetary authorities take affect and lead to a dollar weakness. Improving global market conditions will bolster investor confidence and support emerging market currencies once again and South Africa’s current account is expected to be sufficiently funded by foreign inflows. With limited electricity outages later in the year, following the successful implementation of energy action plans in South Africa and supported by buoyant commodity prices, the rand is now expected to average the year around 7.57 rand:US$1 (from the previously expected 7.1 rand:US$1), giving a depreciation of around 7.3% from 2007. The effect on prices will thus be less than indicated in the alternative scenario. Domestic inflation will also be tempered by lower domestic food prices as good summer rains indicate a bumper crop this year. Nevertheless, a weaker currency could slow the downward trend in interest rates expected from the middle of 2008 onwards.
 

US-India study discovers large gas hydrate presence

An international team led by the US Geological Survey (USGS) and India’s Directorate General of Hydrocarbons released the results Feb. 7 of what they describe as the world’s most comprehensive gas hydrate field venture to date.

In the Krishna-Godavari basin, India’s National Gas Hydrate Program (NGHP) Expedition 01 in 2006 delineated and sampled one of the richest marine gas hydrate accumulations ever discovered. The report said one of the thickest and deepest gas hydrate occurrences yet known was discovered off the Andaman Islands, with gas hydrate-bearing volcanic ash layers as deep as 600 m below the seafloor. It also said, “For the first time, a fully developed gas hydrate system was established in the Mahanadi basin.”

NGHP Expedition 01 was the first modern study of gas hydrates off the Indian peninsula and along the Andaman convergent margin with special emphasis on the geologic and geochemical controls on the occurrence of gas hydrate in these two diverse settings. It was planned to explore 10 sites in four areas: the Kerala-Konkan basin in the Arabian Sea on India’s western continental shelf; the petroliferous Krishna-Godawari basin and Mahanadi basin in the Bay of Bengal; and the previously unexplored Andaman Islands. Scientists conducted ocean drilling, coring, logging, and analytical activities to assess the geologic occurrence, regional context, and characteristics of gas hydrate deposits along India.
The riserless drillship Resolution was operated by Overseas Drilling Ltd. in a 114-day expedition for hydrate deposits off India. Photo from US Geological Survey.

 

Gas hydrates are a naturally occurring, ice-like combination of natural gas and water formed by high pressure and low temperatures in the world’s oceans and polar regions. In the 1990s, the USGS made the first systematic assessment of the volume of gas stored in gas hydrates. Estimates range from 2,800 to 8,000,000 trillion cu m of gas. Conventional natural gas accumulations (reserves and technically recoverable undiscovered resources) for the world are estimated at 440 trillion cu m, USGS reported.

Proponents speculate that this unconventional resource could be developed in conjunction with conventional gas fields. However, the technical challenges are substantial. Proposed methods of gas recovery from hydrates generally deal with dissociating gas hydrates in situ by heating the reservoir beyond the temperature of gas hydrate formation or decreasing the reservoir pressure below hydrate equilibrium.

“The combined wisdom of the scientific community from across the world could provide the answers and solutions to many of these challenges,” said V. K. Sibal, NGHP program coordinator and director general of the hydrocarbons directorate under India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

During its 114-day voyage April-August 2006, the expedition cored or drilled 39 holes at 21 sites (one site in the Kerala-Konkan basin, 15 sites in the Krishna-Godavari basin, four sites in the Mahanadi basin, and one site in the Andaman deep offshore areas), penetrated more than 9,250 m of sedimentary section, and recovered 494 cores encompassing 2,850 m of sediment from 21 holes. Twelve holes were logged with logging-while-drilling tools at 10 sites, and an additional 13 holes were wireline-logged.

 

Gas hydrates are an ice-like combination of natural gas and water formed by high pressure and low temperatures. The expedition collected an “unprecedented” number of gas hydrate cores. Photo from USGS.

 

The expedition discovered gas hydrates in numerous complex geologic settings and collected an “unprecedented” number of gas hydrate cores and scientific data, USGS officials said. It collected vertical seismic profile data at six sites and detailed shallow geochemical profiles at 13 locations. It also established temperature gradients at 11 locations. It brought back an extensive sample collection to support a wide range of postcruise analyses, including:

6,800 whole round-core samples for examination of interstitial water geochemistry, microbiology, and other information.
12,500 core subsamples for paleomagnetic, mineralogical, paleontological, and other analyses.
140 gas-hydrate-bearing sediment samples for storage in liquid nitrogen.
Five 1-m-long gas-hydrate-bearing pressure cores for analysis of the physical and mechanical properties of gas-hydrate-bearing sediment.
21 repressurized cores (9 representing subsamples from gas-hydrate-bearing pressure cores).

Workers conducted 97 deployments of advanced pressure coring devices, resulting in the collection of 49 cores that officials said “contain virtually undisturbed gas hydrate in host sediments at near in situ pressure conditions.”

The NGHP expedition was “a monumental step forward in the realization of gas hydrates becoming a viable energy source,” said USGS Director Mark Myers.

Global gas hydrate resources are estimated to be huge, presenting “unlimited” opportunities for exploration and exploitation, Sibal said. “The Indian gas hydrate program has been fortunate in having the benefits of a truly global collaboration in the form of the first gas hydrate expedition in Indian waters. The results of the studies are not only encouraging but also very exciting. I believe that the time to realize gas hydrate as a critical energy resource has come,” he said.

Participants in the NGHP expedition presented the results of that study at the 3-day Indian National Gas Hydrate Program Gas Hydrate Conference in New Delhi.

NGHP Expedition 01 was planned and managed by the Directorate General, the USGS, and the Consortium for Scientific Methane Hydrate Investigations, led by Overseas Drilling Ltd. and Fugro McClelland Marine Geosciences. The science team was led by Dr. Timothy Collett of the USGS and consisted of more than 100 scientists.

Overseas Drilling was listed as operating the riserless drillship Resolution that was provided by the Joint Oceanographic Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling (JOIDES). Drilling and coring equipment was provided by the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) at Texas A&M University through a loan agreement with the US National Science Foundation. Wireline pressure coring systems and supporting laboratories were provided by IODP, Fugro, the USGS, and the US Department of Energy. Downhole logging operational and technical support was provided by Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University.
 
 

Iraq, Iran and Oil Diplomacy

Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani said on Tuesday that Iraq and Iran will set up a joint committee soon to manage oil development in the two states’ southern border region, according to the Baghdad-based Al-Sabah daily. Most of Iraq and Iran’s oil is concentrated in this border area, and developing the fields that straddle the border would revitalize oil output in both countries.

One of Iran’s major interests in Iraq, after its own national security, is accessing oil wealth. Whether Iraq turns out to be a unitary state or is effectively divided into three parts, Iran has a significant interest in these fields. This interest is intensified by geography. Developing energy reserves in border regions is a tricky business. Because the oil reservoirs are not particularly distinct, tapping a field close to the border can drop reservoir pressure - and thus production - on the other side.

This becomes especially important once slant drilling - the practice of sending off secondary underground shafts perpendicular to the main well - begins. In fact, one of the reasons former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gave for invading Kuwait in August 1990 was that Kuwait was slant drilling into Iraq’s Rumaila field. The thinking in Baghdad and Tehran, then, is that it is best to jointly work on the border region so that any misunderstandings are kept small and addressed early. Or, at the very least, so goes the thinking in the Shiite-dominated Iraqi Oil Ministry and in Iran.

There are two paths here. On one, the Shiites in the South adopt the Kurdish model, creating a regional government and providing access to the oil fields on their terms. The other path would require a national Iraqi oil strategy involving several preliminary steps, among them the adoption of a meaningful petroleum law in Baghdad and an end to the insurgency. Additionally, for the border areas to be developed, there would need to be political settlement between Tehran and both Baghdad and the United States, Iraq’s security guarantor. Either way, the possibilities for future oil production - particularly on the Iraqi side of the border - are impressive.

Currently, the five major oil fields on the Iraqi side of the border - Buzurgan, Al Noor, Halfaya, Majnoon and Nahr Umr - collectively produce about 150,000 barrels per day (bpd). Estimates completed by Western prospecting firms before the 2003 war indicate that their total potential is at least 1.5 million bpd, and this figure does not include potential increases at the Buzurgan field. (Buzurgan was the site of significant fighting - and mining - during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, so studies of its potential capabilities are still pending.)

Of particular interest to both sides is the Majnoon field. Its current Iraqi output is only 50,000 bpd, but with estimated reserves of 20 billion barrels, it is Iraq’s largest field. Baghdad estimates that it alone could produce 600,000 bpd if investment monies were available and a deal were struck with Iran.

We need to look at these actions in the context of the U.S.-Iranian discussions. Washington does not want a fragmented Iraq. If the country were fragmented, the southern portion would - the United States has to assume - fall under direct Iranian control. The Iranians also don’t want fragmentation, since this would create a Sunni state in the center that could, over the years, challenge Iran in the South and directly threaten it.

But fragmentation certainly would be more troubling to the Americans than the Iranians, since it could bring Iranian military power to the Saudi border. Therefore, by moving forward with oil development in the South and hinting at proceeding without a national oil law, the Iranians are raising the specter of fragmentation in the American mind. The postponed bilateral talks and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s March 2 visit to Iraq should both be viewed within the context of each side playing on the worst fears of the other - and that certainly includes an Iranian presence in Iraq’s southern oil fields, completely bypassing the Baghdad government by having the Shia emulate the Kurds.
 
 

Pakistan: Voters Reject Musharraf and the Mullahs

Summary
The allies of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf have fared poorly in the South Asian country’s Feb. 18 parliamentary elections. The election results mean Musharraf has become a lame-duck president, that the successes by Islamists in Pakistan’s previous round of parliamentary elections were a fluke and that the current round of elections were reasonably free and fair.

Analysis
The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) won the majority of the 268 National Assembly seats contested in Pakistan’s Feb. 18 election, Pakistan’s AAJ TV projected the same day. The PPP is estimated to have won 110 seats, the PML-N 100 seats and the pro-government Pakistan Muslim League (PML) 20 to 30 seats. The remaining 20 to 30 seats will go to the Awami National Party, the Muttahida Quami Movement and other smaller parties and independents. Meanwhile, GEO TV is describing the allies of President Pervez Musharraf as having been routed.

Though these are not the official results, by all accounts it appears Musharraf’s allies have indeed been routed. The president’s allies in the PML are not the only casualties in the legislative polls. The Islamist Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), lead by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, also has experienced a major setback in the current election. The MMA ruled the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), shared a coalition government with the PML in Balochistan province and controlled nearly 60 seats in the last national parliament.

Many senior politicians allied with Musharraf lost in their hometown constituencies. These include PML chief Chaudhry Shujat Hussain, former Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, former Parliament Speaker Chaudhry Amir Hussain, former Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, former Parliamentary Affairs Minister Sher Afgan Niazi, former Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and former Defense Minister Rao Sikander Iqbal, among several other party stalwarts.

In the provincial legislatures, the secular Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party is leading in the NWFP, the PML-N is ahead in Punjab province and the PPP leads in Sindh province, with Balochistan as the only province where the pro-Musharraf PML seems to be faring well.

The disastrous outcome for Musharraf’s allies occurred against the backdrop of major international fears that the Musharraf government would engage in vote rigging to ensure that its allies won. It appears that Musharraf was no longer able to make use of the state machinery (especially the intelligence agencies) to rig the vote, however, now that he has stepped down from the position of army chief. Moreover, vote rigging in a tight race is one thing, but rigging an election in which Musharraf’s allies trailed badly is much less feasible. The PPP and the PML-N shared either first or second place in many constituencies in Punjab, a pro-government PML stronghold that accounts for the bulk of seats in the national parliament, which means successful rigging was not possible.

The Musharraf government thus made a major miscalculation as to how its candidates would fare. Musharraf has become a lame-duck president, the Islamist electoral rise in previous parliamentary elections seems to have been a fluke and the elections seem to have been decently free and fair.